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TORTS-LIMITATIONS ON ACTIONS-ARKANSAS ADOPTS CONTIN-
UOUS TREATMENT RULE TO TOLL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS. Lane v. Lane, 295 Ark. 671, 752
S.W.2d 25 (1988).
Dr. Walter Lane treated Maxine Lane for migraine headaches
from 1966 until 1984.1 Dr. Lane's treatment of the headaches in-
cluded regular injections of various types of narcotics. In 1985 Mrs.
Lane brought a medical malpractice action against Dr. Lane alleging
that the treatment caused a number of injuries, including drug addic-
tion, drug dependency, drug abuse, and extensive scarring of her
back, arms, and shoulders.
Dr. Lane moved for summary judgment prior to trial. He con-
tended that because Mrs. Lane's scarring and drug addiction became
apparent by 1979, the cause of action accrued at that time and was
barred under Arkansas' two-year medical malpractice statute of limi-
tations.2 The Pope County Circuit Court denied the motion and
ruled that the statute of limitations did not run until the end of a
continuous course of treatment by the physician.
At the close of evidence, Dr. Lane moved for a directed verdict
and asked the court to reconsider the summary judgment motion
based on the limitations period. The court denied both motions and
the jury awarded Mrs. Lane $44,000. After the verdict, Dr. Lane
moved for judgment n.o.v. and sought a reduction of the jury award
to $13,000 to conform to Mrs. Lane's evidence of damages. Mrs.
Lane elected to have a new trial rather than accept the remittitur or-
dered by the court.
Dr. Lane appealed the denial of his motions for summary judg-
ment and directed verdict on the statute of limitations issue, but the
1. The Lanes were married in 1974 and divorced in 1985. However, the court did not
address the issue of a physician treating a family member. Lane v. Lane, 295 Ark. 671, 673,
752 S.W.2d 25, 26 (1988).
2. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-203 (1987) provides in pertinent part:
(a) All actions for medical injury shall be commenced within two (2) years after the
cause of action accrues.
(b) The date of the accrual of the cause of action shall be the date of the wrongful
act complained of and no other time. However, where the action is based upon the
discovery of a foreign object in the body of the injured person which is not discovered
and could not reasonably have been discovered within such two-year period, the ac-
tion may be commenced within one (1) year from the date of discovery or the date
the foreign object reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is earlier.
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Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the denials. The court adopted the
continuous treatment rule and held that the statute of limitations does
not commence running in appropriate medical malpractice actions
until the physician terminates a continuous course of treatment.
Since Dr. Lane's treatment terminated in July 1984, and Mrs. Lane
commenced the action in May 1985, the complaint was brought
within the two year limitations period. Lane v. Lane, 295 Ark. 671,
752 S.W.2d 25 (1988).
The primary purpose of a statute of limitations is to protect the
defendant from defending a claim after memories have faded, wit-
nesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost.' Arkan-
sas courts hold that a statute of limitations protects the defendant
from having to defend an action in which passage of time would im-
pair the truth finding process.4 The limitations period in medical mal-
practice actions traditionally ran from the time of the wrongful act or
omission.5 The cause of action accrued when the act or omission
caused injury,6 regardless of the plaintiff's knowledge or reason to
know of the injury.7
The harshness of the traditional rule led to a variety of excep-
tions as courts developed methods to circumvent the rule and avoid
unjust results.' Fraudulent concealment of the injury or negligent act
or omission tolled the statute of limitations in most jurisdictions,9 in-
cluding Arkansas.'° In some courts, the defendant's silence in a confi-
dential relationship tolled the statute of limitations.I' The physician's
failure to discover and remove a foreign object left in the plaintiff's
3. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944). See also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (statute of limitations
purpose is to protect courts and defendants from stale claims).
4. McEntire v. Malloy, 288 Ark. 582, 586, 707 S.W.2d 773, 776 (1986).
5. 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 13.06 (1987) [hereinafter
LoUISELL].
6. 2 S. PEGALIS & H. WACHSMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 6:7
(1981). See generally Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and Other
Jurisdictions, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 339 (1962).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 comment e (1979).
8. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 166 (5th ed. 1984).
9. Id.
10. Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934) (physician's failure to apprise
plaintiff of foreign object left in her body after surgery was fraudulent concealment sufficient to
toll limitations period). See also Field v. Gazette Publishing Co., 187 Ark. 253, 59 S.W.2d 19
(1933) (cause of action accrues at time of injury unless defendant fraudulently conceals cause
or extent of injury).
11. See, e.g., Morrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 198 P.2d 590 (1948) (defendant physician's
silence is constructive fraud when duty to speak exists).
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body after surgery constituted a continuing tort in other jurisdic-
tions. 2 Some courts adopted the discovery rule,13 which tolled the
statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovered or should have dis-
covered the injury. 4
The continuous treatment rule first appeared in Gillette v.
Tucker,"5 an Ohio Supreme Court decision. In Gillette the defendant
surgeon left a surgical sponge in the plaintiff's body after an appen-
dectomy.1 6 The court held that the statute of limitations was tolled
until the termination of the physician-patient relationship. 7 The ra-
tionale for the continuous treatment rule was based on: (1) the theory
that the plaintiff suffered a continuous injury while the foreign object
was in her body; and (2) a continuing contractual relationship be-
tween the physician and the patient."8 Since Gillette, courts have dis-
tinguished the termination of the physician-patient relationship rule19
from the continuous treatment rule.2 °
The continuous treatment rule has slowly but steadily gained ju-
12. See Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902) (plaintiff suffered continu-
ous injury until foreign object removed from body). But cf Williams v. Edmondson & Ward,
257 Ark. 837, 520 S.W.2d 260 (1975) (continuing tort theory is legislative issue). In Arkansas,
this issue is addressed under the statutory discovery rule for foreign objects left in the patient's
body. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-203 (1987).
13. Under the discovery rule, the medical malpractice statute of limitations "is initiated,
not by the negligence that is the basis of the action, but by the patient's discovery that he has
been injured by medical treatment." LouISELL, supra note 5, 13.07, at 13-20. See, e.g.,
Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1968) (cause of action accrued when plaintiff's
condition correctly diagnosed and malpractice discovered).
14. Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611, 411 N.E.2d 458 (1980) (cause of action accrued at
the time the injured person discovered or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have discovered the injury).
15. 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).
16. Id. at 108, 65 N.E. at 866.
17. Id. at 129, 65 N.E. at 871.
18. Id. at 133, 65 N.E. at 872.
19. The physician-patient relationship rule could toll the statute of limitations long be-
yond the last date of treatment for the particular injury or condition involving the malpractice.
Under this rule, the cause of action accrues when the physician-patient relationship actually
ends. LOUISELL, supra note 5, at 1 13.09. See, e.g., Ishler v. Miller, 56 Ohio St. 2d 447, 384
N.E.2d 296 (1978) (date physician-patient relationship terminates is time malpractice action
accrues). Cf Hundley v. St. Francis Hosp., 161 Cal. App. 2d 800, 327 P.2d 131 (1958) (statute
of limitations tolled during physician-patient relationship unless patient actually discovers
negligence).
20. Johnson v. Winthrop Laboratories, 291 Minn. 145, 190 N.W.2d 77 (1971) (limitations
period runs when treatment ceases); Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943)
(statute of limitations runs when physician terminates treatment for condition arising from
malpractice); Williams v. Elias, 140 Neb. 656, 1 N.W.2d 121 (1941) (statute of limitations does
not run until treatment ends); Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777,
237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962) (limitations period does not run until continuing course of treatment
terminates). See generally LouISELL, supra note 5, at 13.08 (under continuous treatment
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dicial acceptance.2' Several policy considerations are offered in sup-
port of the rule. The rule fosters the physician-patient relationship by
allowing the patient to pursue effective treatment without losing his
cause of action.22 The rule also provides the physician an opportunity
to correct the injury and avoid potential malpractice actions.23 Fi-
nally, while the purpose of a statute of limitations is to protect the
defendant and courts from stale claims,24 it is unfair to bar a legiti-
mate claim because of the patient's trust in the physician or the latent
nature of the injury.2
Application of the continuous treatment doctrine led to much
litigation as courts developed the scope of the rule.26 To toll the limi-
tations period, many jurisdictions required that the treatment be for
the same or a related illness, injury, or condition involving the mal-
practice. 27 Other courts tolled the statute of limitations until the ter-
mination of the physician-patient relationship. Courts have also
confronted the issue of whether the statute begins to run when the
plaintiff discovers the injury before the continuous treatment ends.
rule, limitations period runs when treatment for the particular injury or condition involving
the malpractice terminates).
21. See supra note 20. See also LOUISELL, supra note 5, at $ 13.08 nn.81 & 84 (discussing
additional jurisdictions recognizing the rule).
22. Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319
(1962). The Borgia court reasoned that "[i]t would be absurd to require a wronged patient to
interrupt corrective efforts by serving a summons on the physician . Id. at 156, 187
N.E.2d at 779, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 321-22.
23. See, e.g., McDermott v. Torre, 56 N.Y.2d 399, 437 N.E.2d 1108, 452 N.Y.S.2d 351
(1982). The McDermott court determined that "[i]mplicit in the policy [behind the continuous
treatment rule] is the recognition that the doctor not only is in a position to identify and
correct his or her malpractice, but is best placed to do so." Id. at 408, 437 N.E.2d at 1112, 452
N.Y.S.2d at 355.
24. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
25. Zepkin, Virginia's Continuing Negligent Treatment Rule: Farley v. Goode and Fenton
v. Danaceau, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 231, 232-33 (1981).
26. Comment, The Continuous Treatment Doctrine: A Toll on the Statute of Limitations
for Medical Malpractice in New York, 49 ALB. L. REV. 64, 72 (1984).
27. Johnson v. Winthrop Laboratories, 291 Minn. 145, 190 N.W.2d 77 (1971) (continuous
and substantially uninterrupted course of treatment for particular illness necessary to toll limi-
tations period); Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943) (statute of limita-
tions runs when physician terminates course of treatment for same or related illness); Borgia v.
City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962) (continuous
treatment must be related to original condition or illness to toll statute of limitations); Frazor
v. Osborne, 57 Tenn. App. 10, 414 S.W.2d 118 (1966) (same or related illness or injury);
Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P.2d 414 (Wyo. 1985) (treatment for illness or condition involving or
related to malpractice). See generally 2 S. PEGALIS & H. WACHSMAN, supra note 6, at § 6:10
(discussing various definitions of continuous treatment rule recognized by courts).
28. See, e.g., Ishler v. Miller, 56 Ohio St. 2d 447, 384 N.E.2d 296 (1978) (date physician-
patient relationship terminates is time malpractice action accrues).
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Most courts hold that the limitations period runs from the date the
patient discovered or should have discovered the negligence or in-
jury.29 One court, however, tolled the statute until the physician-pa-
tient relationship terminated despite the patient's discovery of the
malpractice.3 0
Arkansas followed the traditional rule that any personal injury
action accrued at the time of the negligent act or omission.3 ' In Bur-
ton v. Tribble3 2 the Arkansas Supreme Court first addressed the toll-
ing of the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action. The
defendant physician left a foreign object in the plaintiff's body after
surgery and continued to treat her without discovering and disclosing
the negligence. 33 The court ruled that the plaintiff's malpractice ac-
tion was not barred, although the action was not brought until discov-
ery of the negligence seven years after the surgery.34 In departing
from the traditional rule, the court held that the physician's fraudu-
lent concealment of the injury tolled the limitations period until the
physician corrected the injury or the plaintiff learned or should have
learned of the injury. 35 The Burton court cited Gillette v. Tucker 36 in
29. Hundley v. St. Francis Hosp., 161 Cal. App. 2d 800, 327 P.2d 131 (1958) (limitations
period tolled unless plaintiff actually discovers negligence); Couvillion v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d 737 (La. App. 1976) (statute ran when patient discovered injury
regardless of future treatment by the physician); Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 215
A.2d 825 (1966) (patient's discovery of negligence commenced limitations period); Jones v.
Sugar, 18 Md. App. 99, 305 A.2d 219 (1973) (statute ran when plaintiff should reasonably
have known she had cause of action); Murray v. Fox, 300 Minn. 373, 220 N.W.2d 356 (1974)
(cause of action accrued on date of surgery despite subsequent treatment when plaintiff should
have known of malpractice).
30. Ishler v. Miller, 56 Ohio St. 2d 447, 384 N.E.2d 296 (1978) (court rejected view that
discovery of injury prior to termination of physician-patient relationship commenced limita-
tions period).
31. Field v. Gazette Publishing Co., 187 Ark. 253, 59 S.W.2d 19 (1933). In Field the
plaintiff sued his former employer for negligence in failing to furnish a safe work place. The
plaintiff contracted lead poisoning, a well-recognized industrial disease, and received medical
treatment as soon as the disease manifested itself in 1926. He continued to work intermit-
tently, but became incapacitated in 1928. The plaintiff filed suit in 1929, and the court held
that the action was barred under the three year statute of limitations. The court found that the
cause of action accrued at the time the disease first manifested itself and not at the time the full
extent of the damages was determined.
32. 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934).
33. Id. at 59, 70 S.W.2d at 503.
34. Id. at 62, 70 S.W.2d at 504.
35. Id. Burton has been misconstrued as recognizing the discovery rule for medical mal-
practice actions in Arkansas. Treat v. Kreutzer, 290 Ark. 532, 535, 720 S.W.2d 716, 718
(1986); Williams v. Edmondson & Ward, 257 Ark. 837, 848, 520 S.W.2d 260, 267 (1975). A
careful reading reveals the Burton court tolled the statute of limitations because the physician
fraudulently concealed the tort. Burton, 189 Ark. at 62, 70 S.W.2d at 504.
36. 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902). See supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
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reasoning that the physician's failure to discover and remove the for-
eign object from the plaintiffs' body was a breach of the physician-
patient relationship and a continuing tort.3 7
In response to Burton the Arkansas General Assembly adopted a
medical malpractice statute of limitations. 38 The statute established a
three year limitations period39 and provided that the cause of action
accrued on the "date of the wrongful act complained of and no other
time."'  In Steele v. Gann41 the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted
the statute for the first time, holding that the legislature intended the
cause of action to accrue and the limitations period to run from the
date of the injury.42 The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the
statute did not begin to run until the plaintiff discovered the injury.43
The Arkansas Supreme Court continued to strictly interpret the
statute of limitations, but relied on the fraudulent concealment excep-
tion to avoid injustice." Some justices criticized the court for being
too quick in finding fraudulent concealment.45  In Jones v.
C.A.R. TI.46 the plaintiff filed a malpractice action more than two
years after suffering injuries during radiation therapy. The court
found that the physician's dilatory tactics and failure to schedule fur-
ther examinations until the limitations period had run constituted
fraudulent concealment.47  Justice Stroud's dissent questioned
whether fraudulent concealment existed when the defendants first
learned of the plaintiff's injuries from the plaintiff himself.48
Similarly, in Crossett Health Center v. Croswell 9 the plaintiff
brought an action upon discovering that a foreign object was left in
37. Burton, 189 Ark. at 61, 70 S.W.2d at 504.
38. Act of Mar. 20, 1935, No. 135, § 1, 1935 Ark. Acts 135 (codified as amended at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-114-203 (1987)).
39. In 1945 the Arkansas General Assembly shortened the medical malpractice limita-
tions period from three years to two years. Act of Feb. 16, 1945, No. 58, § 1, 1945 Ark. Acts
58 (codified as amended at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-203 (1987)).
40. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-203 (1987) provides in pertinent part: "The date of the
accrual of the cause of action shall be the date of the wrongful act complained of and no other
time."
41. 197 Ark. 480, 123 S.W.2d 520 (1939).
42. Id. at 485, 123 S.W.2d at 523.
43. Id. at 486, 123 S.W.2d at 523.
44. See Jones v. C.A.R.T.I., 270 Ark. 988, 607 S.W.2d 334 (1980); Crossett Health Center
v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548 (1953).
45. See CA.R.T.., 270 Ark. at 991, 607 S.W.2d at 336 (Stroud, J., dissenting); Croswell,
221 Ark. at 884, 256 S.W.2d at 553 (Smith, J., dissenting).
46. 270 Ark. 988, 607 S.W.2d 334 (1980) (4-3 decision).
47. Id. at 990, 607 S.W.2d at 335.
48. Id. at 991, 607 S.W.2d at 336 (Stroud, J., dissenting).
49. 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548 (1953).
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her body after surgery. Although the suit was brought more than two
years after the surgery, the court concluded that the action was not
barred. 0 The court found that the defendants' failure to discover the
foreign object presented a fraudulent concealment question for the
jury." In a strong dissent Justice Smith stated "[tihere could be no
[fraudulent] concealment of a fact which was unknown to the
defendants."52
The court expressly declined opportunities to adopt less restric-
tive rules to determine the date when the cause of action accrued in
medical malpractice actions. In Owen v. Wilson 5 3 the court refused to
adopt the continuing tort theory and held that the issue was a legisla-
tive question.54 In Williams v. Edmondson & Ward 5 the court re-
jected the discovery rule.56 The court construed the malpractice
statute of limitations as running from the date of the wrongful act
regardless of the plaintiff's lack of knowledge of the injury. 7
In 1979 the Arkansas General Assembly adopted a limited dis-
covery rule for medical malpractice actions involving foreign objects
left in the plaintiff's body. 8 If the object is not discovered during the
limitations period, the action can be brought within one year from the
date the object is or should have been discovered.59 The legislature
also codified the common law rule' tolling the malpractice statute of
50. Id. at 878, 256 S.W.2d at 550.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 884, 256 S.W.2d at 553 (Smith, J., dissenting).
53. 260 Ark. 21, 537 S.W.2d 543 (1976).
54. Id. at 24, 537 S.W.2d at 544. The continuing tort theory would treat a single negli-
gent act as a continuing injury until the injury is either discovered by the patient or corrected
by the physician. For example, a misdiagnosis or negligent X-ray reading would effectively toll
the statute of limitations on the theory that the plaintiff was damaged throughout the entire
period. See Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934); Silvertooth v. Shallen-
berger, 49 Ga. App. 758, 176 S.E. 829 (1934); Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865
(1902).
55. 257 Ark. 837, 520 S.W.2d 260 (1975).
56. Id. at 848, 520 S.W.2d at 267. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text for
discussion of the discovery rule.
57. 257 Ark. at 848, 520 S.W.2d at 267.
58. Act of Apr. 2, 1979, No. 709, § 4, 1979 Ark. Acts 709 (codified as amended at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-114-203 (1987)).
59. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-203(b) (1987) provides in pertinent part:
[W]here the action is based upon the discovery of a foreign object in the body of the
injured person which is not discovered and could not reasonably have been discov-
ered within [the two-year limitations period], the action may be commenced within
one (1) year from the date of discovery or the date the foreign object reasonably
should have been discovered, whichever is earlier.
60. See Graham v. Sisco, 248 Ark. 6, 449 S.W.2d 949 (1970) (general savings clause for
minors applicable to any statute of limitations).
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limitations for minors and incompetents.6' The statute allows a mi-
nor plaintiff to bring an action until age nineteen 62 and provides that
any person who was incompetent at the time of the injury has until
one year after the disability is removed to bring suit.63  In Treat v.
Kreutzer' the court refused to expand the limitations period beyond
the scope established by the legislature.
After Treat it appeared certain that Arkansas courts would con-
tinue to strictly construe the medical malpractice limitations period.
In Lane v. Lane, 65 however, the court effected a major liberalization
of the statute. With Justice Hays speaking for the majority,6 6 the
court adopted the continuous treatment rule67 and held that the stat-
ute of limitations in medical malpractice actions is tolled during a
continuous course of improper treatment. 68 The court distinguished
the continuous treatment rule from the continuing tort theory it had
previously rejected, 69 holding that the continuing tort theory70 was a
public policy issue. 7 1 To recognize the continuing tort theory, the
court said, would have the practical effect of applying the discovery
61. Act of Apr. 2, 1979, No. 709, § 4, 1979 Ark. Acts 709 (codified as amended at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-114-203 (1979)).
62. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-203(c) (1987) provides in pertinent part: "A minor under
the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the act, omission, or failure complained of, shall in
any event have until his nineteenth birthday in which to commence an action."
63. Id. § 16-114-203(d) provides in pertinent part: "Any person who had been adjudi-
cated incompetent at the time of the act, omission, or failure complained of, shall have until
one (1) year after that disability is removed in which to commence an action."
64. 290 Ark. 532, 720 S.W.2d 716 (1986) (rejecting discovery rule and holding that con-
tinuing tort theory is legislative issue).
65. 295 Ark. 671, 752 S.W.2d 25 (1988).
66. Hickman, J., dissented but wrote no opinion. Id. at 678, 752 S.W.2d at 29.
67. Id. at 677, 752 S.W.2d at 28. The court quoted LOUISELL, supra note 5, 13.08, at 13-
34 in defining the continuous treatment rule:
[1]f the treatment by the doctor is a continuing course and the patient's illness, injury
or condition is of such a nature as to impose on the doctor a duty of continuing
treatment and care, the statute does not commence running until treatment by the
doctor for the particular disease or condition involved has terminated unless during
treatment the patient learns or should learn of negligence, in which case the statute
runs from the time of discovery, actual or constructive.
Lane, 295 Ark. at 674, 752 S.W.2d at 26-27.
68. Lane, 295 Ark. at 674, 752 S.W.2d at 27.
69. Id. at 675, 752 S.W.2d at 27. The court cited three previous decisions to distinguish
the continuous treatment rule from the continuing tort theory: Treat v. Kreutzer, 290 Ark.
532, 720 S.W.2d 716 (1986) (misdiagnosis is not a continuing tort); Owen v. Wilson, 260 Ark.
21, 537 S.W.2d 543 (1976) (failure to remove foreign object from patient's body after surgery is
a single negligent act and not a continuing tort); Williams v. Edmondson & Ward, 257 Ark.
837, 520 S.W.2d 260 (1975) (injury is complete at time physician misreads X-ray).
70. See supra note 54.
71. Lane, 295 Ark. at 675, 752 S.W.2d at 27.
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rule.72 This would be contrary to the statute's express language that
the cause of action accrues on "the date of the wrongful act com-
plained of and no other time."73
The court concluded, however, that the continuous treatment
rule does not conflict with the statute.74 The court relied on Farley v.
Goode75 for the proposition that even a state with a "time of injury"
statute for medical malpractice actions76 recognized the continuous
treatment rule.77 Prior to Farley the Virginia Supreme Court held
that the cause of action accrued and the limitations period ran when
the wrong was done and not when the plaintiff discovered the in-
jury.78 The Farley court determined that when malpractice occurred
during a continuous course of treatment for a particular condition,
the statute of limitations ran when the treatment terminated. 79 The
court reasoned that the entire course of treatment was inherently neg-
ligent.8 0 However, Farley limited the rule by excluding malpractice
actions where the complaint alleged a single, isolated negligent act.8
The Lane court also reasoned that the continuous treatment rule
is logical and fair.82 Barring legitimate claims merely because the
plaintiff cannot identify a single negligent treatment that caused the
injury is inequitable.83 The rule also gives the physician an opportu-
nity to correct the error before harm results.84 Moreover, the rule
does not force the plaintiff to disturb the physician-patient relation-
ship by terminating treatment in order to preserve the cause of ac-
tion.85 Finally, the court recognized a steady trend toward judicial
72. Id. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
73. Lane, 295 Ark. at 675, 752 S.W.2d at 27 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-203
(1987)).
74. Id. at 676-77, 752 S.W.2d at 28.
75. 219 Va. 969, 252 S.E.2d 594 (1979).
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-230 (1984 & Supp. 1988) provides in pertinent part: "[T]he
cause of action shall be deemed to accrue and the prescribed limitation period shall begin to
run from the date the injury is sustained in the case of injury to the person ....
77. Lane, 295 Ark. at 677, 752 S.W.2d at 28.
78. Farley, 219 Va. at 974, 252 S.E.2d at 598.
79. Id. at 976, 252 S.E.2d at 599.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 980, 252 S.E.2d at 601. The Farley court stated "[w]here the malpractice com-
plained of constitutes a single, isolated act, however, the [time of injury rule] will continue to
apply." Id. The Lane court did not provide such explicit guidance. Lane left unanswered the
question of whether the limitations period will be tolled if there is a single negligent act fol-
lowed by a continuous course of non-negligent treatment.
82. Lane, 295 Ark. at 675-76, 752 S.W.2d at 27.
83. Id. (quoting LOUISELL, supra note 5, at 1 13.08).
84. Id.
85. Id.
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acceptance of the continuous treatment rule. 6
Lane is significant for several reasons. The adoption of the con-
tinuous treatment rule is the first significant judicial liberalization of
the medical malpractice limitations period since 1935. Prior to
Lane the court tolled the limitations period only for common law88 or
statutory exceptions.89 The court repeatedly declined opportunities to
change the medical malpractice limitations period and found the issue
to be a public policy question for the legislature.9"
The Lane decision is also significant because the continuous
treatment rule increases the potential liability of medical malpractice
defendants. 9' The rule favors the plaintiff in misdiagnosis, X-ray, and
radiology treatment malpractice actions.92 Courts have also extended
the continuous treatment rule to malpractice actions against other
professionals. The rule has been used to toll the limitations period
against attorneys, 93  architects, 94  insurance brokers,95  and
accountants.
96
86. Id. at 676, 752 S.W.2d at 27-28 (citing 16 jurisdictions recognizing the rule). See also
LouISELL, supra note 5, at 13.08 nn.81 & 84 for additional jurisdictions adopting the rule.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
88. Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934) (fraudulent concealment of the
injury tolls the statute of limitations in medical malpractice).
89. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-203(c) & (d) (1987) (tolling statute of limitations for mi-
nors and incompetents). See also Graham v. Sisco, 248 Ark. 6, 449 S.W.2d 949 (1970) (general
savings clause for minors applicable to any statute of limitations).
90. Treat v. Kreutzer, 290 Ark. 532, 535, 720 S.W.2d 716, 718 (1986); Owen v. Wilson,
260 Ark. 21, 24, 537 S.W.2d 543, 544 (1976); Steele v. Gann, 197 Ark. 480, 485, 123 S.W.2d
520, 523 (1939).
91. Arkansas subjects a variety of "medical care providers" to the statute. ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-114-201(2) (1987) reads in pertinent part:
"Medical care provider" means a physician, certified registered nurse anesthetist,
physician's assistant, nurse, optometrist, chiropractor, physical therapist, dentist, po-
diatrist, pharmacist, veterinarian, hospital, nursing home, community mental health
center, psychologist, clinic, or not-for-profit home health care agency licensed by the
state or otherwise lawfully providing professional medical care or services, or an of-
ficer, employee or agent thereof acting in the course and scope of employment in the
providing of such medical care or medical services[.]
92. Previously, the Arkansas Supreme Court held such actions barred under the medical
malpractice statute. Treat, 290 Ark. 532, 720 S.W.2d 716 (1986) (misdiagnosis); Williams v.
Edmondson & Ward, 257 Ark. 837, 520 S.W.2d 260 (1975) (misreading X-ray). See also Jones
v. C.A.R.T.I., 270 Ark. 988, 606 S.W.2d 752 (1980) (negligent radiation therapy malpractice
action barred but for fraudulent concealment).
93. Keller v. Denny, 232 Va. 512, 352 S.E.2d 327 (1987).
94. County of Broome v. Vincent J. Smith, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 889, 358 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup.
Ct. 1974).
95. Ben Heller, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 107 Misc. 2d 687, 435 N.Y.S.2d
669 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
96. Wilkin v. Dana R. Pickup & Co., 74 Misc. 2d 1025, 347 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
CONTINUOUS TREATMENT RULE
The precise ramifications of Lane will depend upon future litiga-
tion interpreting the scope of the continuous treatment rule. The
court did not make clear what elements are necessary for the rule to
apply. One limitation on the rule is that the statute will run if the
plaintiff knows or should know the injury is attributable to malprac-
tice.97 However, this arguably gives judges new latitude to reach de-
sired results. Proving whether a layperson knew or should have
known she was the victim of malpractice is a speculative venture at
best. For example, the court held that Mrs. Lane did not know or
have reason to know that negligent treatment was responsible for her
injuries, although she was addicted to drugs for several years before
bringing the action. 98
Perhaps the most significant question left unsettled by Lane is
whether the statute will be tolled if there is only a single negligent act,
rather than a series of negligent acts. Suppose a patient develops an
infection as a result of a negligent act by the physician during surgery.
The patient does not know and has no reason to know the infection is
attributable to malpractice, and the surgeon continues to provide non-
negligent treatment for the infection. Nevertheless, one year later the
infection causes complications, and the patient suffers injury. The
physician's treatment terminates at that point. Two years later, the
patient brings a medical malpractice action. Does the continuous
treatment rule toll the statute of limitations?
The opinion in Lane suggests it would not. The court states that
"the continuous treatment doctrine becomes relevant when the medi-
cal negligence consists of a series of negligent acts, or a continuing
course of improper treatment."99 Yet all of the policy considera-
tions"° for the rule dictate that the rule should apply. In all likeli-
hood, the holding that a series of negligent acts is required for the rule
to apply is necessitated by the language of section 16-114-203 that the
cause of action accrues at the time of the wrongful act and no other
time. Tolling the limitations period during a continuous course of
97. Lane, 295 Ark. at 674, 752 S.W.2d at 26-27. The court stated that the limitations
period is tolled under the continuous treatment rule "unless during treatment the patient
learns or should learn of negligence, in which case the statute runs from the time of discovery,
actual or constructive." Id. (quoting LOUISELL, supra note 5, at § 13.08).
98. Id. at 678, 752 S.W.2d at 28. The court also stated that "we are not inclined to hold
that a physician, aware of a patient's drug dependency, may nurture the habit and continue to
be the provider over a period of years and then successfully contend the patient should have
brought the action earlier." Id. Arguably, the court would have tolled the statute regardless
of Mrs. Lane's knowledge of the malpractice.
99. Id. at 675, 752 S.W.2d at 27.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
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negligent treatment does no violence to the statute since the wrongful
acts did in fact occur at different times throughout the treatment.
However, where only a single negligent act has occurred, application
of the continuous treatment rule would be contrary to the express
statutory language. Regardless of future decisions, Lane is a signifi-
cant liberalization of Arkansas medical malpractice law.
John D. Nichols
